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TITLE VII: PRIVATE ACTIONS
JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES TO PRIVATE
ACTIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
I. INTROflUCTION
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to elim-
inate discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin.' Congress selected cooperation and voluntary compli-
ance as the preferred means for obtaining equality in employment oppor-
tunity.2 To this end, Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission 3 (EEOC) and established a procedure whereby existing state
and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well as the'EEOC,
would have an opportunity to settle charges of discrimination through
"conference, conciliation and persuasion." 4 Additionally, the 1972 amend-
ments to the Act gave the EEOC the power to institute civil actions against
employers or unions named in a discrimination charge.5
Congress also gave private individuals a significant role in the en-
forcement process of Title VII. When, in the view of the complaining
party, the EEOC has not pursued his complaint with satisfactory speed
or has entered into a conciliation agreement that is unacceptable to him,
he may initiate a private action in a federal district court.6 In so doing,
the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also furthers
congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices. The
private right of action is an essential means of obtaining judicial enforce-
ment of Title VII T
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.(Supp. III, 1973). For the legislative history of the Act and its amendments, see
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. Rlv. 431 (1966); Sape
& Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
40 Gxo. WAmH. L. REv. 824 (1972).
2. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1963).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (Supp. III, 1973). The EEOC consists of five
members appointed for five-year terms by the President, with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. The EEOC has regional and state offices as well as its head-
quarters in Washington, D.C.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970). Title VII requires deferral to state proceed-
ings in cases where there is "a state or local law prohibiting the unlawful em-
ployment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a state or local author-
ity to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings
with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof." Several decisions have sought
to determine when a state has established or authorized an agency to grant or seek
relief from discrimination. See, e.g., Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691,
10 FEP Cases 625 (10th Cir. 1975); General Ins. Co. of America v. EEOC, 491
F.2d 133, 7 FEP Cases 106 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5() (Supp. III, 1973). The EEOC may not sue a gov-
ernment, government agency, or political subdivision, but must refer the case
to the Attorney General who may initiate suit.
6. Id.
7. See generally Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of.
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109 (1970).
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There are various jurisdictional prerequisites to a private action under
Title VII designed to allow the EEOC as well as state and local agencies
to perform their conciliatory function.8 Although conciliation inevitably
delays prompt judicial vindication of Title VII rights, Congress apparently
decided that the objectives of the Act could best be served by giving these
informal measures a chance to work. 9 From the statutory language, the
congressional committee reports, and the statements of key legislators, it
is clear that Congress intended that all persons claiming discrimination
in employment first exhaust their remedies with the Commission created
for that purpose.10 Accordingly, the federal courts of appeals have required
an individual to exhaust his administrative remedies, both state and fed-
eral, before instituting court action against the employer."'
The primary exhaustion requirement is the filing of a claim of em-
8. Title VII sets out the following procedural steps for processing a charge
with the EEOC:
A charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of an
alleged unlawful employment practice. (If a charge is filed initially with
a state or local agency within 180 days after the alleged unlawful em-
ployment practice occurred, the charge must be filed with the Commis-
sion within 300 days after the alleged practice occurred, or within 30
days after receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated
its proceedings, whichever occurs first.)
After a charge is filed (or once the state or local deferral is ended),
EEOC must serve a notice of the charge on the respondent within 10 days.
EEOC must then investigate the charge to determine whether there
is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true.
The Commission must make its determination of reasonable cause
as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable, within 120 days.
If it finds no reasonable cause, the Commission must dismiss the
charge; if it finds reasonable cause, it will attempt to conciliate.
If the Commission is unable to secure a conciliation agreement that
is acceptable to it within 30 days, it may bring a civil action in an appro-
priate U.S. district court.
If EEOC doesn't bring an action within 180 days, it must notify the
aggrieved party, who then has 90 days to file a suit on his own behalf.
[citations omitted]
BNA FAIR EmPLOYMENT PRAcTIcE MANUAL 431:11-12 (1975). See also the sum-
mary of procedures by Representative Dent in the Congressional Record, March
8, 1972, reprinted in BNA, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY Acr or 1972,
at 297 (1973).
9. Comment, supra note 7, at 1199-1200.
10. Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239, 1
FEP Cases 182 (4th Cir. 1967). See also H.R. RPR. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
86 (1963).
H1. Olson v: Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 10 FEP Cases 27 (8th
Cir. 1975); Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118, 5 FEP Cases 1134
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859 (1973); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398
F.2d 496, 1 FEP Cases 328 (5th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co..
402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir. 1968); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267, 1 FEP Cases 235 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
910 (1968); Mickel v. South Carolina State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239,
1 FEP Cases 182 (4th Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court has described the juris-
dictional prerequisites to a Title VII suit as including filing timely charges of
employment discrimination with the EEOC. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973).
[Vol. 41
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ployment discrimination with the EEOC. Absent such a filing, a federal
court is precluded from considering a claimant's Title VII claim. Under
no circumstances may a person seek federal court relief from employment
discrimination without first going to the EEOC.'1 2 As a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to suit, this filing requirement is uncomplicated. Yet various
collateral requirements have created complex problems for the potential
litigant under Title VII. These additional requirements are the subject
of this comment.
II. FILING A CHARGE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
As a general rule, all claims must be filed with the EEOC within
180 days following the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment
practice. 13 Charges may be filed by a member of the EEOC, an aggrieved
party, or any person on his behalf.14 A timely filing with the EEOC is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under Title VII.15 In addition to Title
VII, many state statutes and local ordinances also forbid discrimination in
employment. Those states having authority to grant or seek relief from
unlawful employment practices through existing state or local fair em-
ployment practice agencies are known as "deferral states."'-
A. Deferral Period
A charging party must give an existing state or local agency a mean-
ingful opportunity to resolve charges of discrimination in employment.
To this end, Title VII provides that no charge may be filed with the
EEOC before the expiration of 60 days after proceedings have been com-
menced under state or local law, or after the termination of such proceed-
ings, whichever occurs first.l 7 Compliance with this procedure has been
held to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to the initiation of a suit in district
12. See cases cited note 11 supra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)
(1970). See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP Cases 81
(1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973);
Revere v. Tidewater Tele. Co., 485 F.2d 684, 6 FEP Cases 891 (4th Cir. 1973);
Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84, 6 FEP Cases 1139 (5th Cir. 1973); Harris
v. National Tea Co., 454 F.2d 307, 4 FEP Cases 103 (7th Cir. 1971); Goodman
v. City Products Corp., 425 F.2d 702, 2 FEP Cases 608 (6th Cir. 1970); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir. 1968). Although
these cases dealt with the 90-day filing period of section 2000e prior to the 1972
amendments, their current applicability is unquestioned.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
15. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 10 FEP Cases 27 (8th
Cir. 1975); Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 4 FEP Cases 454 (7th Cir.
1972); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir.
1968). Cf. Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 491 F.2d 1294, 7 FEP Cases 482 (9th
Cir. 1974).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c) (Supp. II, 1973). See note 4 supra.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. Il, 1973).
1976]
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court.'8 Although the law states that no charge may be filed with the
EEOC without first going to the state or local agency, the Supreme Court
has approved the EEOC's practice of accepting a charge, orally referring
it to the state or local agency involved, and then processing it upon the
lapse of the 60-day deferral period without requiring a second filing.19
The failure to defer a charge to an existing state or local agency
constitutes a bar to further action by the charging party in federal court.
Dismissal of the action, however, is not warranted. In such circumstances,
the district court will retain jurisdiction for a time sufficient to allow
the state or local agency the statutory deferral period in which to act before
continuing the case.2 0 However, in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.21 the
District Court of Arizona declined to follow this procedure on the grounds
that the applicable state period of limitation for filing a charge with the
state had already run when the case was presented to it. Instead of defer-
ring the charge to the state agency previously by-passed by the plaintiff,
the court dismissed the charge for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the
court pointed out that it is to the advantage of all concerned that civil
rights complaints involving employment discrimination be simply 'and ex-
peditiously handled at the local administrative level. 22 According to the
court, any arrangement which provides for less than the requisite state
deferral will inevitably detract from the state agency's effectiveness. Con-
sequently, the parties will feel free to ignore the state agncy so long as
they know there is parallel machinery to which they can turn.2 3
B. EEOC's Extended Filing Period
The sole statutory exception to the 180-day EEOC filing limitation
period is activated if a charge is filed initially with a state or local agency
following the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment practice. 24
In these cases, a subsequent filing with the EEOC may be made within 300
days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or within 30 days after
receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated its proceed-
18. EEOC v. Union Bank, 408 F.2d 867, 1 FEP Cases 429 (9th Cir. 1968);
Electrical Workers Union Local 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248, 1 FEP Cases 335 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
19. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 4 FEP Cases 150 (1972). See also
Vigil v. A.T.&T. Co., 455 F.2d 1222, 4 FEP Cases 345 (10th Cir. 1972).
20. Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 6 FEP
Cases 171 (9th Cir. 1973); Motorola, Inc. v. EEOC, 460 F.2d 1245, 4 FEP Cases
755 (9th Cir. 1972); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 466 F.2d 24, 4 FEP
Cases 1144 (6th Cir. 1972); Lewis v. FMC Corp., I1 FEP Cases 31 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
21. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 165, 10 FEP Cases
289, 292 (D.C. Ariz. 1975). See also Padilla v. Stringer & City of Albuquerque, 395
F. Supp. 495, 10 FEP Cases 575 (D.N.M. 1974); Rucker v. Great Scott Supermar-
kets, Inc., 11 FEP Cases 473 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
22. 390 F. Supp. at 165.
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (Supp. 111, 1973).
[Vol. 41
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ings, whichever occurs first. The purpose of this extended filing period
in a "deferral state" is to give the state agency an initial opportunity to
process the claim without jeopardizing the federal right.2 5
While the Act requires initial resort to an available state or -local
remedy, it is uncertain whether a timely filing under state law is required
to obtain the benefit of the extended filing period with the EEOC. In
Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co. 26 the Eighth Circuit held that Congress
did not intend to allow states to frustrate the federal remedy by imposing
limitation periods shorter than 180 days. Under the Olson approach, a
charge of employment discrimination must simply be filed within 180 days
of the alleged occurrence.2 7 In a deferral state, such as Missouri,28 a com-
plainant must file with the state or local agency within 180 days, notwith-
standing the presence of a shorter state limitations period. The complainant
is then given the benefit of the extended filing period, the lesser of 300
days since the alleged violation or 30 days after the state or local agency
terminates its action, to allow him to pursue the local claim without prej-
udice to any possible federal rights.29 In this context, the present 90-day
limitation period of the Missouri Human Rights Commission is not
controlling. The Eighth Circuit's ruling has no effect, however, on this
limitation period as it applies to claims under state law.3 0
In contrast to the Olson position, the Tenth Circuit in Dubois v. Pack-
ard-Bell Corp.31 held that a state fair employment commission's refusal
to process a charge of employment discrimination on the ground that the
25. Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228, 10 FEP Cases 27 (8th
Cir. 1975).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1232, 10 FEP Cases at 29. See also Case No. KC7-5-315, 1973 CCH
EEOC DEc. f 6024, 2 FEP Cases 80 (1969), where the Commission concluded that
compliance with state statutes of limitation is not a prerequisite to its jurisdic-
tion. However, the Commission interprets section 2000e-5(e) as giving a person in
a deferral state 300 days or 30 days after termination of state proceedings in
which to file with the EEOC.
Since the Act does not make commencement of proceedings with
the Commission dependent in any way upon the substance of State or
local action or inaction, the latter provision [2000e-5 (e)] is a limitation
upon the extent of the primary jurisdiction granted by [§ 2000e-5(c)].
Both Sections cannot be read as granting primary exclusive jurisdiction
to the extent that the operations of a State or local statute of limitations
could oust the Commission of jurisdiction entirely, since such a reading is
refuted absolutely by the plain terms of the Act.
Case No. KC7-5-315, 1973 CCH EEOC DEc. at 4047, 2 FEP Cases at 80. Accord,
Case No. KC7-3-187, 1973 CCH EEOC DEc. 6058 (1969). Cf. 29 C.F.R.§ 1601.12 (b) (1) (v). The Eighth Circuit found such a position cannot be supported
by the statute or its legislative history.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1975). The Missouri Commission on Human Rights
has received provisional approval from the EEOC to exercise authority in the area
of unlawful employment practices. See also § 296.010 et seq., RSMo 1969; Whit-
tier & Whittier, Employment Discrimination: Alternative Remedies to Title VII,
43 U.M.K.C. L. RIv. 296 (1975).
29. 511 F.2d at 1232, 10 FEP Cases at 29.
30. Id.
31. 470 F.2d 973, 5 FEP Cases 265 (10th Cir. 1972).
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charge was not filed with the state agency within the state's limitation
period did not constitute a "termination of [state] proceedings" within
the meaning of section 2000e-(5)(e) of Title VII.32 Therefore, the com-
plainant could not invoke the extended limitations period for filing a
grievance with the EEOC. Under this view, failure to satisfy state filing
limitation requirements will result in complete foreclosure of Title VII
relief. The effect of this decision is to deny a plaintiff any possibility of
by-passing state proceedings in favor of a federal remedy by simply wait-
ing until the state is prevented by statute or regulation from considering
the claim before filing a charge with the EEOC.
The Dubois decision is based upon the acknowledged purpose of the
deferral period to allow state and local agencies an effective opportunity
to resolve a charge of discrimination in employment.3 3 The court stated
that the legislative history of the Act is so "manifestly clear as to remove
all doubt" that one of its purposes was to insure that states will be able
to process employment discrimination charges under local law before
the plaintiff resorts to federal remedies. 34 The court noted that a con-
trary result "[would fly] in the face of the congressional intent"3 to
accord a preference for the voluntary settlement of grievances at the local
level.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the Dubois case the limitations
period for filing a charge with the EEOC was limited to 90 days.3 6 That
is, the charge in Dubois was filed with the EEOC after both the state statute
of limitations and the then 90-day federal limitation period had run. The
plaintiff in Dubois was not allowed to invoke the extended filing period
with the EEOC, then 180 days. However, Dubois is not expressly limited
to its facts37 and, under current law, the situation could arise in which
the basic federal filing period of 180 days was satisfied by the complainant,
but the shorter state filing period was not. Under the Dubois approach,
the absence of a timely filing under state law would preclude redress in
either state or federal court.
However, in this situation the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite re-




36. 470 F.2d at 974, 5 FEP Cases at 266. The original Act, under which the
case was decided provided that a claim of employment discrimination must be
filed with the EEOC within 90 days following its occurrence. The New Mexico
Human Rights Commission also provided for a 90-day filing limitation period. The
charging party filed no charge with the state, yet filed with the EEOC 144 days
after the alleged discriminatory occurrence. Failure to file with the state within
the prescribed period of 90 days precluded application of the extended filing
period, 210 days total under the original statute. The present 180-day filing lim-
itation period of the EEOC probably does not affect the validity of Dubois. See
Note, Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp.: Compliance with the State Procedures as a
Condition Precedent to Relief Under Title I'll, 1973 DuKE L.J. 749.
37. See Note, supra note 36, at 757. This position has not been shared by all.
See, e.g., Davis v. Valley Dist. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 10 FEP Cases 1473 (9th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 41
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sult in Davis v. Valley Distributing Co. 38 The Davis court said that the
state remedy may be significantly different in kind or scope from the
federal remedies afforded by Title VII, and therefore a state period of
limitation cannot control a federal remedy.39 The court found it unlikely
that Congress intended that its judgment about the period within which
a claim of employment discrimination affecting interstate commerce might
be made could be displaced by state legislatures.
As an additional basis for its decision, the court could not find a
significant reasoi why a complainant would wish to by-pass a state remedy
altogether, as feared by the Tenth Circuit in Dubois.40 It is well established
that an adverse ruling in a state or local fair employment commission
proceeding is not a bar to subsequent Title VII action. 41 These two rem-
edies were intended by Congress to be separate and distinct, not mutually
exclusive. Nevertheless, under the 1972 amendments to the Act, the EEOC
is required, in determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe
that a violation has occurred, to accord "substantial weight" to these find-
ings and orders made by state and local agencies. 42 It is submitted that
this factor, although apparently overlooked by the Ninth Circuit, may
be good reason why a complainant may strive to avoid a state agency's
disposition on the merits.
It is possible that a state limitation period for filing a charge of
employment discrimination may be longer than the 180-day period pro-
vided for filing Title VII complaints. 43 In this situation a charging party
could file with the state agency within its limitation period, but more
than 180 days after the alleged discrimination. The issue that would then
arise is whether he may invoke the extended period of 300 days to file
with the EEOC. The language of Olson, requiring a complainant to file
a charge with a state agency within 180 days after the alleged discrimina-
tion in order to have 300 days to file with the EEOC, would mandate
dismissal of the charge.44 However, in Williamson v. Chevron Research
Co.45 the District Court for the Northern District of California found
nothing in the statutory language or its legislative history to support this
requirement. The court held that when the state allows more than 180 days
38. 522 F.2d 827, 10 FEP Cases 1473 (9th Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 833, 10 FEP Cases at 1476. 'The court did not reach the issue
whether the longer federal limitations period would be available to a complainant
whose state filing is untimely.
40. Id.
41. Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 8 FEP Cases 746 (7th
Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9, 4 FEP Cases 943 (6th Cir.
1972); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 4 FEP Cases 74 (2d Cir.
1971). The same rule would apply if the state agency fails to give a timely ruling.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (b) (Supp. II, 1972).
43. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1422 (West 1971).
44. 511 F.2d at 1233, 10 FEP Cases at 29.
45. 12 FEP Cases 95 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Contra, Roberts v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 11 FEP Cases 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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in which to file a charge, a timely state filing will invoke the 300-day lim-
itation period for filing with the EEOC.4 6
III. TOLLING OF THE EEOC FILING LIMITATION PERIOD
A. Continuing Discrimination
It is well settled that the 180-day limitation period for filing a charge
of employment discrimination with the EEOC is no bar when the discrim-
ination being challenged is a continuing practice, rather than a single,
isolated discriminatory act. A general rule has evolved in the circuits that
a plaintiff alleging a continuing violation of Title VII may file charges
with the EEOC at any time during which the alleged continuing violation
has taken place.4 7 The rationale is to provide a remedy for past actions
which operate to discriminate against the complainant at the present
time. However, insertion of the word "continuing" in an EEOC com-
plaint, without more, does not raise a per se claim of continuing discrim-
ination.4 8 A decision as to the continuing nature of the charge is made
by the EEOC in the investigative stage based on all relevant information.4
B. Title VII and Collective Bargaining Contracts
The tolling of the 180-day limitation period during the time spent
in a collective bargaining grievance-arbitration process pursuant to the
nondiscrimination clause of a union contract is a matter of continuing
concern and disagreement. The problem arises when a complainant pursues
his or her contractual grievance remedies prior to the institution of a
civil suit under Title VII. The Act does not speak expressly to the relation-
ship between the federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery
of collective bargaining agreements. However, in Alexander v. Gardner-
46. 12 FEP Cases at 96. In an amicus brief, the EEOC pointed out that all
of the states in the Eighth Circuit require that a charge be filed with the state
agency within 180 days or less. The Olson court's dictum requiring that a charge
be filed either with a state agency or with the EEOC within 180 days is thus in
accord with the practice in the Eighth Circuit. The Williamson court distinguished
Olson because it did not consider a factual situation where the state allows more
than 180 days in which to file a timely charge. .d.
47. Griffin v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 478 F.2d 1118, 5 FEP Cases 1134 (9th
Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 5 FEP Cases
994 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 469 F.2d 1249, 5 FEP
Cases 251 (8th Cir. 1972); Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 458 F.2d 443, 4
FEP Cases 590 (5th Cir. 1972); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186,
3 FEP Cases 795 (7th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 3
FEP Cases 653 (4th Cir. 1971).
48. See Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1184, 10 FEP Cases 314
(N.D. Ga. 1975).
49. Courts differ widely regarding the degree of deference which should be
afforded to a decision by the EEOC to consider the complaint as timely. See, e.g.,
Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 5 FEP Cases 994 (D.C.
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Denver Co."o the Supreme Court construed the legislative history of the
Act to mean that Title VII was intended "to supplement, rather than
supplant," existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrim-
ination. Therefore, an employee's statutory right to trial de novo under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not foreclosed by prior submis-
sion of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause
of a collective bargaining agreement. 51
Prior to Gardner-Denver the courts agreed that the EEOC filing
limitation period is tolled while the grievance-arbitration process func-
tions.5 2 These cases recognized that although the time limit for filing with
the Commission is jurisdictional,53 the alleged unlawful employment prac-
tice cannot be said to have occurred completely until the contractual rem-
edies provided by the collective bargaining agreement have been exhausted.
The courts emphasized that statutes of limitations are directed at those
who sleep on their rights and not those who invoke familiar and informal
remedies established by the "rules of the shop." 54 Accordingly, the limita-
50. 415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974). See generally Coulson, The Emerg-
ing Role of Title VII Arbitration, 26 LAB. L.J. 263 (1975); Note, 24 DRAKE L. REv.
236 (1974); Note, 24 CATHOLiC U. L. Rrv. 126 (1974).
51. 415 U.S. at 59, 7 FEP Cases at 90. According to the Court neither election
of remedies, waiver, nor the federal labor policy respecting arbitration bars the
employee, whose claim of racial discrimination was rejected by an arbitrator, from
bringing an action under Title VII.
In the Court's desire to promote the national policy favoring the elimination
of discriminatory employment practices, it has created a situation whereby griev-
ance-arbitration procedures may be used by employees to prove the existence
of discrimination, but not by employers to rebut such allegations. Thus, the adop-
tion of this approach virtually nullifies an employer's possibilities of favorably
settling claims of discrimination in the grievance-arbitration procedure.
52. Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 F.2d 811, 4 FEP Cases 454 (7th Cir. 1972);
Malone v. North American Rockwell Corp., 457 F.2d 779, 4 FEP Cases 544 (6th
Cir. 1972); Hutchings v. U.S. Industries, 428 F.2d 303, 2 FEP Cases 725 (5th Cir.
1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 2 FEP Cases 377 (5th
Cir. 1970); Phillips v. Columbia Gas Co., 347 F. Supp. 533, 5 FEP Cases 240
(S.D. W, Va. 1972), af 'd, 474 F.2d 1342, 5 FEP Cases 859 (4th Cir. 1973). Private
attempts at settlement or conciliation not within the confines of the grievance pro-
cedure under the labor contract do not suspend the time limits of the statute.
Moore v, Sunbeam Corp., supra at 827, 4 FEP Cases at 465.
53. But see Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 11
FEP Cases 235 (5th Cir. 1975).
54. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, Co., 421 F.2d 888, 892, 2 FEP Cases 377,
379 (5th Cir. 1970).
Culpepper suggests another interesting question, the converse of
the one involved in that case. Suppose an employee with a complaint
cognizable under both the grievance-arbitration procedure and Title VII
utilizes his statutory remedy and then seeks to invoke the grievance pro-
cedure after the running of the limitation period prescribed in the con-
tract. Should the running of the contractual period be suspended for the
period in which statutory remedies were invoked? That result plainly could
not be supported as a means of encouraging resort to arbitration or on
the ground that there were special difficulties in utilizing the statutory
procedures where racial discrimination was involved. Such a suspension
could, however, be defended on two other grounds invoked in Culpepper.
First, the employee had not slept on his rights and thus had warned the
1976)
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tion period does not begin to run until the grievance procedures have been
completed.
Since Gardner-Denver the courts have disagreed on the issue. The
Tenth Circuit has recognized and affirmed the validity of the existing
authority in the area. 55 In Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,50 however, the
Sixth Circuit held that an employee's filing of a grievance with respect to
her allegedly discriminatory discharge did not toll the running of the EEOC
filing limitation period. The court said this result was dictated by two
recent Supreme Court cases. The court noted that in view of Gardner-Den-
ver and the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 57 it would be inconsistent to hold that the pursuit of any
remedies under the Taft-Hartley Act, federal, state, or local fair employ-
ment practice statutes, or a collective bargaining contract operate to toll
other remedies which the employee has a right to resort to concurrently. 8
In Gardner-Denver the Court emphasized that rights under Title VII
and the rights under a collective bargaining contract have legally independ-
ent origins and are equally available. These coexisting rights are distinctly
separate by nature. An employee submitting a grievance to arbitration
seeks to vindicate his contractual rights, whereas his Title VII action con-
cerns statutory rights afforded by Congress.59 In Johnson the Supreme
Court, fifteen months after Gardner-Denver, stressed that remedies avail-
able under the 1866 Civil Rights Act and those available under Title VII
are separate, distinct, and independent8 ) Accordingly, if an individual
files a complaint with the EEOC and later sues under the 1866 Act, the
statute of limitations on the 1866 Act claim is not tolled by the filing of
the complaint. 61
The Sixth Circuit observed that to hold that the federal filing period
is tolled by the mere filing of a grievance under a collective bargaining
employer of the need to preserve pertinent evidence. Second, limitation
periods should be subordinated to the requirements of "justice," which
might in this context mean preserving all available remedies and giving
an employee whose statutory claim is denied an opportunity to pursue
his contractual remedies. Arbitrators may, however, find these considera-
tions an insufficient basis for enlarging contractually prescribed limita-
tion periods.
Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Em-
ployment Discrimination, 39 U. Cin. L. Rv. 30, 49 (1971).
55. Sanchez v. T.W.A., 499 F.2d 1107, 8 FEP Cases 627 (10th Cir. 1974).
56. 525 F.2d 124, 11 FEP Cases 641 (6th Cir. 1975).
57. 421 U.S. 454, 10 FEP Cases 817 (1975).
58. 525 F.2d at 126, 11 FEP Cases at 643. The Guy court noted that all earlier
cases upholding the tolling of the 180-day limitation period during the time spent
in arbitration were decided prior to Gardner-Denver and hence were inapposite.
59. 415 U.S. at 49, 7 FEP Cases at 86.
60. 95 S. Ct. at 1721, 10 FEP Cases at 820.
61. Id. at 1722-23, 10 FEP Cases at 821-22. Actually, the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), contains no stated limitations period. The federal
courts, therefore, apply whichever state limitation period would be applicable
to the state action most clearly resembling the suit based on the 1866 Act. Franks
v. Bowman Trans. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 8 FEP Cases 66 (5th Cir. 1974).
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contract would mean that the exercise of rights under Title VII could be
delayed indefinitely while an individual is pursuing other remedies. 62 This
contention conflicts with congressional intent made manifest by the short
periods of time provided in the Act as prerequisites for the exercise of
the rights. 3
C. Equity and the Filing Limitation Period
The Fifth Circuit has recently carved out yet another exception to
the 180-day filing limitation period. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity At-
lanta, Inc.6 4 held that the EEOC filing limitation period does not begin
to run until facts that would support a charge of discrimination under
Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with
a reasonable, prudent regard for his rights. If there are no indications
that the basis of a charge of discrimination was unknown to the plaintiff
until after the alleged discriminatory incident took place, the regular
filing period is applicable. 65
The impact of Reeb lies in the court's decision that the requirement
of a timely filing with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit
in the sense that strict compliance determines the jurisdiction of a district
court, without respect to any of the other circumstances in a particular
case. 66 By treating the filing requirement as a statute of limitations, the
Fifth Circuit has apparently sanctioned the use of equitable doctrines
such as tolling and estoppel. That is, although the filing of a complaint
with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private action under
Title VII, the filing limitation period itself is to be construed as a statute
of limitations.67
The terminology used to describe the 180-day filing limitation period
has not been consistent. Historically, confusion arose from a court's de-
scribing the limitation period as "jurisdictional" but then analyzing it
62. 525 F.2d at 128, 11 FEP Cases at 642.
63. The argument that the Johnson rationale supports the view that the
EEOC filing limitation period is not to be tolled while the employee seeks con-
tractual remedies has been refuted by a district court. See Bush v. Wood Bros.
Transfer, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 1030, 11 FEP Cases 113 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
64. 516 F.2d 924, 11 FEP Cases 235 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 at 336 n.3, 11 FEP Cases 300 at 302
n.3 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. 516 F.2d at 928, 11 FEP Cases at 238. The Act contemplates that com-
plaints initiating EEOC proceedings will be brought by laymen. The court found
that it is reasonable, therefore, for courts to refuse to apply technical rules of
common law to charges initially filed with the EEOC. Remedial legislation, such
as Title VII, is entitled to the benefit of liberal construction. See, e.g., Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 4 FEP Cases 150 (1972); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC,
412 F.2d 462, 1 FEP Cases 787 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,
400 F.2d 28, 1 FEP Cases 364 (5th Cir. 1968); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir. 1968).
67. 516 F.2d at 928, 11 FEP Cases at 238. The view that the 90-day require-
ment is not jurisdictional finds support in a Supreme Court decision. See Love v.
Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 4 FEP Cases 150 (1972).
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as if it were a statute of limitations.68 This characterization has often been
employed in cases involving continuing discriminatory practices which
are said to "toll" the running of the 180-day period, as well as in cases
involving the "tolling" of the period during the time spent in a collective
bargaining grievance-arbitration process. In the context of the latter sit-
-uation, the court in Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. has expressly referred
to the filing limitation period as a jurisdictional prerequisite.6 9 According
to the Sixth Circuit, the filing limitation in Title VII is more than a mere
statute of limitations, and should not be treated as such.
IV. REJEcTED PREREQUISITES TO SUIT
At one time or another virtually every step in the conciliation process
of the EEOC has been asserted as an essential element of the private en-
forcement scheme, observance of which was arguably necessary to the trial
court's jurisdiction.7 0 It has been submitted, for instance, that because a
complainant failed to pursue contractual grievance procedures readily avail-
able to him, he has failed to exhaust all administrative remedies and
thus is barred from bringing suit under Title VII. This argument conflicts
with the rationale of Gardner-Denver and has been refuted by the courts. 7'
An additional jurisdictional objection that has been made is that the
absence of an EEOC determination of reasonable cause bars a subsequent
private action under Title VII. Clearly such a determination is a prerequi-
site to the Commission's initiation of conciliation efforts.72 However, to
engraft such a requirement onto the jurisdictional prerequisites to private
action would inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination
in the federal courts.73 McDonnell Douglas, Inc. v. Green74 stands for the
68. See, e.g., Cox v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 1 FEP Cases 714 (7th
Cir. 1969). Cases such as Cox have referred to the filing limitation period itself
as a "jurisdictional" prerequisite to suit, yet, at the same time, ruled that the
time period was "tolled" in the presence of appropriate circumstances. Virtually all
courts say that lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and, in fact,
must be raised by the court itself if the parties fail to raise it. In light of this fact
and the overwhelming authority which exists to the effect that the filing lim-
itation period will be tolled or modified in certain instances, it is only fitting that
such limitation period be correctly designated as a statute of limitations. Proper
delineation of the issues here, however, does not alter the basic substantive law
relating to a particular set of circumstances.
69. 525 F.2d at 127, 11 FEP Cases at 642.
70. For a thorough discussion of cases to date involving prerequisites to suit,
see Comment, supra note 7, at 1199-1216.
71. Hardison v. T.W.A., 375 F. Supp. 877, 10 FEP Cases 502 (W.D. Mo.
1974). See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive, Co., 416 F.2d 711, 2 FEP Cases 121 (7th
Cir. 1969); text accompanying note 51, supra.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
73. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973).
See also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 3 FEP Cases 653 (4th Cir. 1971);
Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 3 FEP Cases 74 (5th Cir.
1971); Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205, 2 FEP Cases 881 (7th Cir. 1970);
Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 2 FEP Cases 540 (3d Cir. 1970).
74. 411 U.S. 792, 5 FEP Cases 965 (1973).
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proposition that Title VII does not restrict a complainant's right to sue
to those charges on which the EEOC has made findings of reasonable
cause.
Title VII provides that when the EEOC has made a finding of reason-
able cause, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful em-
ployment by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persua-
sion." 75 Several appellate courts have held that no actual effort on the
part of the EEOC to conciliate is required before a federal court may
entertain a Title VII action.7 Title VII merely requires that the Commis-
sion have an opportunity to persuade the employer or union before a pri-
vate action can be brought. To hold otherwise would be to require a
complainant to pursue an administrative remedy, which may be impossible
to achieve, at the sacrifice of any effective judicial remedy.77
Title VII, as amended, expressly provides that the EEOC "shall serve
notice of the charge on such employer . ..within ten days" after it has
been filed. 78 Nevertheless, failure by the EEOC to serve such notice of the
charge is not jurisdictional and will not defeat a private action in federal
court.70 Although the administrative procedures directed towards concil-
iation of the discrimination charges are a central part of the Title VII
scheme, the courts have reasoned that the individual's prerogative to bring
a statutorily conferred right of action should not depend upon acts beyond
his knowledge or control.
V. STATUTORY NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUE
A. Requirement of Receipt of "Notice"
As seen above, a filing with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to subsequent judicial consideration of a charge of employment discrim-
ination under Title VII. If the Commission is not able to process a com-
plaint with satisfactory speed or enters into a conciliation agreement that
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (a) (Supp. III, 1973).
76. See, e.g., Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. R.R., 406 F.2d 399, 1 FEP Cases 583 (5th
Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645; 1 FEP Cases 456
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir. 1968); Electrical Workers Local 5 v.
EEOC, 398 F.2d 248, 1 FEP Cases 335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1968).
77. Comment, supra note 7, at 1207.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
79. See EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 395 F. Supp. 600, 10 FEP Cases 1229 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); Escamilla v. Mosher Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 101, 9 FEP Cases 49 (S.D.
Tex. 1975); Padilla v. Stringer, 395 F. Supp. 495, 10 FEP Cases 575 (D.N.M.
1974); Veazie v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 374 F. Supp. 811, 7 FEP Cases 999
(E.D. La. 1974); Healen v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 8 FEP Cases 917 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Johnson v. ITT Thompson Inds., 323 F. Supp. 1258, 3 FEP Cases 225 (N.D.
Miss. 1971); Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 309 F. Supp. 1096, 2 FEP Cases
107 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
Also, a charge need not be sworn to in order for a federal court to obtain
jurisdiction over the matter. Russell v. American Tobacco Co., F.2d _ , 11
FEP Cases 395 (4th Cir. 1975); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357,
1 FEP Cases 431 (7th Cir. 1968).
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is not acceptable to the aggrieved party, the complainant may then seek
his own federal court remedy. More specifically, if the Commission dis-
misses a charge, or if, within 180 days of the filing of the charge, it has
neither issued a complaint nor entered into a conciliation or settlement
acceptable to both the aggrieved party and the Commission, the Commis-
sion is required to so notify the charging party.8 0 Although this notification
by the EEOC is commonly referred to as a "notice of right to sue," the Act
nowhere speaks in such terms. The phrase is simply a label employed by
the courts and the Commission to describe the statutory notice given by
the Commission which triggers the complainant's right to sue in a Title VII
action.8 '
The courts have insisted that the complainant receive this "notice of
right to sue" from the EEOC before bringing suit.8 2 The Act provides
that a Title VII suit be filed within 90 days following the receipt of the
notice of right to sue8 3 and the federal courts of appeals which have con-
sidered the issue have uniformly held that this 90-day period is jurisdic-
tional and mandatory.8 4 The failure of a charging party to bring a civil
action in his own name within 90 days after the receipt of the statutory
notice deprives a federal district court of subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Notification of Dismissal of a Charge
The requirement of receipt of the statutory notice of right to sue
applies only to the dismissal of charges or other termination of the adminis-
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. III, 1978).
81. The courts have frequently referred to the statutory notification given
by the EEOC which triggers the complainant's right to sue in a Title VII action
as a "right to sue" letter. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 798, 5 FEP Cases 965, 967 (1973); EEOC v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d
71, 75, 7 FEP Cases 177, 178 (8th Cir. 1974); United Textile Workers v. Federal
Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849, 850-51, 4 FEP Cases 907, 908 (8th Cir. 1972). The
Commission regulations have also referred to these notifications as "notices of
right to sue." 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (1975).
82. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 5 FEP
Cases 965, 967 (1973); Hinton v. CPC International, Inc., 520 F.2d 1312, 10 FEP
Cases 1423 (8th Cir. 1975); Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 2 FEP
Cases 519 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497
F.2d 416, 424, 7 FEP Cases 1245, 1252 (6th Cir. 1974).
83. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provides for a 90-day
filing period following receipt of the right to sue letter. Originally the time period
was 30 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (Supp. II, 1973), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (e) (1970).
84. Hinton v. CPC International, Inc., 520 F.2d 1312, 10 FEP Cases 1423
(8th Cir. 1975); Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 509 F.2d 1027, 10 FEP Cases
192 (9th Cir. 1975); Genovese v. Shell Oil Co., 488 F.2d 84, 6 FEP Cases 1139
(5th Cir. 1973); Archuleta v. Duffy's Inc., 471 F.2d 33, 5 FEP Cases 347 (10th
Cir. 1973); Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 268, 5 FEP Cases 154
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 939 (1973); Harris v. National Tea Co., 454
F.2d 307, 4 FEP Cases 103 (7th Cir. 1971); Goodman v. City Products Corp., 425
F.2d 702, 2 FEP Cases 608 (6th Cir. 1970). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. FED. 833,
§ 12 (a) (1970). More specifically, this filing limitation period is not a statute of
limitations which can be tolled on equitable principles.
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trative proceedings which took place after an effort at conciliation, and
only in those cases in which the EEOC had found there was reasonable
cause to believe that the charges were true.85 Dismissal of a charge prior
to conciliation brings into play different provisions of Title VII with
respect to notice than does a failure to obtain a conciliation agreement.8 6
If the Commission determines after investigation that there is not reason-
able cause to believe that a charge is true and dismisses the charge, it must
promptly notify the charging party of its action.8 7 Under these circum-
stances, issuance of a formal notice of right to sue is irrelevant.88 In this
situation the 90-day limitation period is activated upon receiving notice
of dismissal.8 9 The result here is that the 90-day limitation period cannot
be extended indefinitely until the charging party, weeks or months after
the receipt of the dismissal notice, asks the Commission to issue him a
second, or "right to sue," notice.
C. Right to Demand a Notice of Right to Sue
The complainant may demand the statutory "notice of right to sue"
any time after the passage of 180 days from the date a charge was filed
with the EEOC, or from the date the EEOC first had jurisdiction to in-
vestigate the charge after deferral to a state or local authority, whichever
is later.90 The right to demand a notice of right to sue exists, provided
the Commission has not dismissed the complaint, achieved a conciliation
agreement, or filed a civil action prior to that time.9 1 The Commission
85. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cases 929 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
511 F.2d 306, 10 FEP Cases 153 (2d Cir. 1975); Barfield v. A.R.C. Security, Inc.,
10 FEP Cases 789 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
87. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 1309, 10 FEP Cases
929, 934 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976). See also DeMatteis v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 310, 10 FEP Cases 153, 156 (2d Cir. 1975).
88. 517 F.2d at 1310, 10 FEP Cases at 935. "Dismissal," under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973), precedes and is not dependent upon the aggrieved
party's application for notice thereof. Although the section does not specify how
soon after "dismissal" the Commission must notify the party, it is clear that the
duty to provide the notice which commences the running of the period of limita-
tion arises automatically and without any action by the claimant.
89. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 1309, 10 FEP Cases 929,
935 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. III, 1973), provides that the Commission
"shall so notify the person aggrieved" if within 180 days it has neither conciliated
the dispute nor brought suit. In its regulations, the Commission has construed this
language to require the issuance of the statutory notice on demand of the charg-
ing party after 180 days have elapsed from the filing of the charge. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.25b(c) (1975).
91. See Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cases 929
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 511 F.2d 306, 10 FEP Cases 153 (2d Cir. 1975); Patton v. Conrad Area School
District, 388 F. Supp. 410, 10 FEP Cases 764 (D. Del. 1975). When any of the
three sets of circumstances referred to in subsection (f)(1) of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
[othcr than dismissal under subsection (b)] has occurred after some efforts at
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need not have completed its investigation of the charge nor have com-
pleted conciliation efforts at the moment of issuance of the notice.9 2 The
receipt of the notice letter, not the exhaustion of conciliation efforts,
constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.93 The effect of allowing
a complainant to request a notice of right to sue from the EEOC, other
than in the situation of a dismissal based on lack of reasonable cause, is
to place in the hands of the charging party the ability to select the ap-
proximate time he wants the notice to be issued and the 90-day limitation
period to begin to run.
In several cases the defendant-employer has sought to have this 180-
day waiting period construed as a statute of limitations which automatically
starts the 90-day limitation period. The courts have found the 180-day
period to be directory and not mandatory. The result is that the courts
have refused to cut off a complainant's right to sue because the Com-
mission had not notified the plaintiff that conciliation efforts had failed
upon reaching the one hundred-eightieth day following receipt of the charge
by the EEOC.9 4
While it is dear that no right to demand a right to sue letter ac-
crues to the charging party before the expiration of the 180-day period, it
is unclear whether a notice to sue letter may be issued before then.1 In
cases where investigation cannot be completed by the Commission in any
event within 180 days, the EEOC practice is to issue, upon request, a
right to sue letter within the 180-day period.96 This period is a time within
which the EEOC has the power and the duty to conciliate a case. Never-
theless, a lack of resources and a backlog of charges may prevent the
EEOC from instituting any action before the 180-day period from the
filing of the charge expires. Accordingly, the majority of the courts con-
sidering the issue have decided that as long as the EEOC had the oppor-
tunity to investigate and conciliate within the 180-day period, a notice of
right to sue issued during that time is not defective.9 7 However, other
conciliation have been made, the EEOC has the statutory duty to inform the
charging party of the status of his case.
92. See Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, 456 F.2d 1359, 4 FEP
Cases 512 (9th Cir. 1972); Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 3 FEP
Cases 858 (5th Cir. 1971); Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 2 FEP Cases
540 (3d Cir. 1970); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 1 FEP Cases
647 (5th Cir. 1969).
93. See Dent v. St. Louis-S.F. R.R., 406 F.2d 399, 1 FEP 583 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
94. See Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 1 FEP Cases 861 (9th
Cir. 1969); Howard v. Mercantile Trust Co., 10 FEP Cases 158 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
95. Issuance may be by the Attorney General or the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5 (f) (1) (Supp. III, 1973).
96. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b (1975).
97. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 10 FEP Cases 1331 (2d Cir. 1975;
Westerlund v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 11 FEP Cases 744 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11 FEP Cases 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Howard v. Mercantile
Trust Co., 10 FEP Cases 158 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Bauman v. Union Oil Co., 6 FEP
Cases 212 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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courts have considered the EEOC to have exclusive jurisdiction during the
180-day period, precluding the charging party from bringing suit in that
time.9 8
D. Termination of EEOC Proceedings
Even absent a demand from a charging party, official notice of right
to sue must issue to the complainant upon a determination by the EEOC
not to file suit. At that time, the 90-day limitation period will begin to
run.99 In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit in Tuft v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.100 noted that the purpose of the notice of right to sue pro-
vision is to fix the time when the administrative remedies of the EEOC
have ended. The court conceded the fact that prior to the 1972 amend-
ments the EEOC administrative procedures ended with the termination of
conciliation efforts. However, the court found that under current law,
these administrative procedures end with the determination that the Com-
mission will not file suit against the party named in the charge.10 1
Furthermore, the court stated that requiring the EEOC to issue a notice of
right to sue upon termination of the administrative procedures comports
with the expressed congressional desire to place the primary burden of
enforcing Title VII on the Commission, rather than on the private com-
plainant.102
VI. THE EEOC's "Two LETTER" PROCEDURE
After the EEOC has decided that reasonable cause exists to believe
that a charge of discrimination is true, the Commission will commence
conciliation with the party named in the charge. If conciliation efforts fail,
it has been the practice of the EEOC to send two formal communications
to charging parties.103 The first letter informs them that conciliation ef-
forts by the EEOC have failed and that the charging party could, if so
desired, request a formal notice of right to sue from the Commission. The
second letter, when so requested, tells them that they can sue the employer
98. See EEOC v. Duval Corp., F.2d -, 11 FEP Cases 1313 (10th
Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 387 F. Supp. 1224, 10 FEP Cases 946 (D. Colo.
1975); Jones v. P.I.E., 10 FEP Cases 914 (N.D. Cal. 1975); EEOC v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786, 6 FEP Cases 722 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
The procedural scheme established by the Act for the EEOC, according to
these courts, is simple. First, no one may sue within the first 30 days after a
charge is filed. Secondly, between the 30th day and the 180th day only the EEOC
may sue. Thirdly, after the 180th day, if notice is given to the charging party,
both the EEOC and the complainant may sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. III,
1973).
99. Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cases 929 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1039, 10 FEP Cases at 934.
102. Id.
103. The EEOC's amicus brief filed in Tuft indicated that a two letter
procedure has been followed in approximately 200 cases under the jurisdiction of
the Commission's St. Louis district office.
1976]
17
Kaemmerer: Kaemmerer: Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Private Actions
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
within 90 days of receipt.10 4 This procedure was devised by the EEOC
prior to the 1972 revision of the Act in order to overcome the problems
faced by many charging parties in obtaining counsel and filing an action
before the then 30-day period expired. By alerting the charging party to
the fact that his case was almost ready for litigation and making the send-
ing of the notice of right to sue dependent upon his request, the EEOC
sought to prevent charging parties from missing the limitations period. 105
The cases involving this procedure have arisen in the context of a
filing of a Title VII action in federal court by an employee more than 90
days after receipt of notice from the EEOC of failure of conciliation (first
letter), but less than 90 days after receipt of the notice of right to sue
(second letter). The issue presented is whether the 90-day limitation period
of Title VII for filing a private action in a federal district court is triggered
by the notice from the EEOC to the charging party of failure of concilia-
tion or if the running of the limitation period is delayed until such time
as the charging party requests and receives a formal notice of right to
sue.10 Deciding that the date of the second notice is the controlling one
would have the effect of continuing the plaintiff's action. Deciding that
the date of notice of non-conciliation is controlling would oust the plaintiff's
Title VII claim from the district court's jurisdiction, the 90-day time limit
having elapsed.
Only two appellate courts have directly considered this issue. In Tuft
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.0 7 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the no-
tice of right to sue cannot issue until the completion of the administrative
process. Absent dismissal of the charge or the filing of an action by the
EEOC itself, the court found that the process is completed when the Com-
mission decides not to sue.' 08 Because the first notice did not mention
whether the EEOC had decided not to sue, but only informed the charging
party that the conciliation had failed, the court found no basis for con-
struing the first notice as initiating the 90-day limitation period. The
104. The exact text of the letters involved in Tuft are set forth in the
opinion. 517 F.2d at 1303 nn.4, 5, 10 FEP Cases at 930 nn.4, 5.
105. BNA, 89 LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER ANALYSIS 25 (1975).
106. See Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., - F.2d , 12 FEP
Cases 5 (10th Cir. 1976).
107. 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cases 929 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Lacy v.
Chrysler Corp., F.2d -, 12 FEP Cases 471 (8th Cir. 1976).
108. 517 F.2d at 1309, 10 FEP Cases at 934. The court found that such a
reading of the Act would comport with the expressed congressional desire to
place the primary burden of enforcing Title VII on the Commission rather than
the private complainant.
If the statute required the issuance of notice at some intermediate
stage of the administrative process, an aggrieved person would be required
to either sue within 90 days or lose his right to sue without knowing
whether or not the Commission would file suit on his behalf. Moreover,
this construction remains consistent with pre-1972 procedures which geared
the issuance of notice to exhaustion of administrative remedies.
[Vol. 41
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Tenth Circuit has expressly adopted this interpretation of the Act by the
Tuft court and subscribed to its rationale.10 9
Numerous district courts have disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's
analysis and taken the position that the EEOC's first letter is really a no-
tice of right to sue. 110 These courts have concluded that the statutory notice
need only inform the complainant that conciliation efforts have failed.
Thus, the EEOC's first letter satisfied this requirement. The major objec-
tion that has been raised alleges that the effect of the "two letter" pro-
cedure is to abolish any limitation period whatsoever, thereby frustrating
the legislative intent to provide for expediting suits filed under this Act."'
That is, the "two letter" procedure affords charging parties complete con-
trol over commencement of the filing period. The result of allowing a
complainant to wait an indefinite period of time to file an action would
be to allow the EEOC, in effect, to "repeal" the limitations portion of the
Act.11 This line of cases stresses the inconsistency of encouraging inor-
dinate delays in Title VII proceedings prior to the institution of civil pro-
ceedings while attaching a sense of urgency to a case after such a suit is
filed. Additionally, these courts have found that the 1972 amendments to
Title VII did not alter the fact that it is the notice of failure of concilia-
tion, not exhaustion of Commission procedures, which triggers the run-
ning of the 90-day limitation period.113
109. Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co., __ F.2d -, 12 FEP Cases 5
(10th Cir. 1976).
110. Clark v. Delta Refining Co., 11 FEP Cases 1372 (W.D. Tenn. 1975);
Williams v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 11 FEP Cases 897 (E.D. La. 1975); McGuire
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 11 FEP Cases 858 (S.D. Ind. 1975); Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1179, 11 FEP Cases 748 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
Keeling v. St. Louis-S.F. R.R., 11 FEP Cases 700 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Kirkwood v.
Pidgeon Thomas Iron Co., 11 FEP Cases 699 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Pope v. North
Hills Passavant Hospital, 11 FEP Cases 590 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Taylor v. Lockheed
Georgia Co., 11 FEP Cases 575 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Bottoms v. St. Vincent's Hospital,
11 FEP Cases 392 (S.D. Ind. 1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp.
403, 11 FEP Cases 145 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Mungen v. Choctaw, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 1349,
10 FEP Cases 1345 (W.D. Tenn. 1975); Kelly v. Southern Products Co., 10 FEP
Cases 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Whitton v. ITT Cannon Elec., 395 F. Supp. 492, 10
FEP Cases 1207 (D. Ariz. 1975); Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 10 FEP Cases 1268
(S.D. Cal. 1975); Barfield v. A.R.C. Security, Inc., 10 FEP Cases 789 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
See also DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 10 FEP Cases 153 (2d Cir.
1975); Cleveland v. Douglas Aircraft Corp., 509 F.2d 1027, 10 FEP Cases 192 (9th
Cir. 1975), citing Harris v. Sherwood Medical Industries, 386 F. Supp. 1149, 8
FEP Cases 1142 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
111. See, e.g., Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 1179, 11 FEP
Cases 748 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Wilson v. Sharon Steel Corp., 399 F. Supp. 403, 11
FEP Cases 145 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Kelly v. Southern Products, Co., 10 FEP Cases
1221 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306,
10 FEP Cases 153 (2d Cir. 1975).
112. From the Commission's files, it has been found that at times charging
parties have waited almost a year (337 days) before requesting a formal "notice to
sue" letter. Whitfield v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 389 F. Supp. 274, 276 n.2,
9 FEP Cases 5, 6 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd sub nom., Tuft v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cases 929 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
782 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Bottoms v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 11 FEP Cases 392 (S.D. Ind.
1976]
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A third approach to the issue has been taken by several district
courts.' 1 4 This view agrees with the majority of the decisions that in Title
VII cases the 90-day limitation period begins to run once the charging
party receives notice that conciliation efforts have either terminated or
have failed. However, these courts have reasoned that, as a matter of equity,
they should not penalize a plaintiff for defects in EEOC procedure.1 15
The Tuft court also utilized this rationale as an alternative basis for its
decision. 1 6 That is, even if the Act could be construed to require the
issuance of the notice of right to sue upon the failure of conciliation efforts,
the first letter explicitly informed the complainant that the 90-day limita-
tion period would not begin to run until receipt of the second notice. Ac-
cordingly, the Eighth Circuit noted that because the complainant did not
receive effective notification of the requirement of suit within 90 days
after receipt of the first letter, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant,
the complainant should not suffer because of errors or omissions on the
part of the Commission. 1 7 Nonetheless, the majority of courts have refused
to apply this equitable concept. They have held that reliance upon the
EEOC does not excuse the failure to comply with a jurisdictional pre-
requisite." 8
VII. BRINGING A SUIT
There is general agreement that if a plaintiff files no papers what-
soever with a federal district court within the 90-day time period following
receipt of notice of right to sue, his claim is barred. However, the law is
by no means clearly settled on whether an action is timely commenced
where the plaintiff has filed his notice of right to sue letter as well as a
request for appointment of counsel 19 within the 90-day time limit, but
has not filed a formal complaint. 120
Some courts have held that merely filing the right to sue letter in
1975); Whitton v. ITT Cannon Elec., 395 F. Supp. 492, 10 FEP Cases 1207 (D.
Ariz. 1975); Barfield v. A.R.C. Security, Inc., 10 FEP Cases 789 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
114. Roberts v. Ivey Construction Co., 11 FEP Cases 697 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
Diaz v. Food Fair Stores, 11 FEP Cases 920 (D. Colo. 1975); Stansell v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 11 FEP Cases 928 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Taylor v. P.I.E., 394 F. Supp. 72,
10 FEP Cases 826 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
115. Id. See also Gates v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 7 FEP Cases
416 (9th Cir. 1974); Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357, 1 FEP Cases
431 (7th Cir. 1968).
116. 517 F.2d at 1310, 10 FEP Cases at 935.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., McGuire v. Aluminum Co. of America, 11 FEP Cases 858(S.D. Ind. 1975); Barfield v. A.R.C. Security, Inc., 10 FEP Cases 789 (N.D. Ga.
1975); Kelly v. Southern Products Co., 10 FEP Cases 1221 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Wilson
v. Sharon Steel Co., 399 F. Supp. 403, 11 FEP Cases 145 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
119. Courts are authorized to appoint attorneys for the aggrieved individual
"in such circumstances as the court may deem just," and they may permit the
commencement of the suit without payment of fees, costs, or security. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) (Supp. III, 1973).
120. "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the Court."
FFD. R. CIv. P. 3.
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the district court within the specified time period is an initiation of an
action. This filing is found to satisfy the 90-day limitaton period despite
the fact that it does not comply with the requirements for pleading found
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 121 Proponents of this view argue
that such an interpretation comports with the remedial nature of the
statute.
A second line of cases, led by the Sixth Circuit, have construed the
filing of the notice of right to sue or request for appointment of counsel
to be a sufficient compliance with the filing requirement.1 22 However,
rather than hold that the limitation period is satisfied irrespective of a
subsequent delay in filing, this view requires that a formal complaint be
filed within a reasonable time following the appointment of counsel.' 2 3
A third appellate court has decided that the filing of such papers
merely tolls the running of the limitation period until counsel is ap-
pointed.12 4 After the charging party obtains an attorney, the period con-
tinues to run.
The decisions of all three of these courts were made in the setting of
the pre-1972 amendments 30-day filing limitation period, a factor which ob-
viously influenced the outcomes. In view of the present 90-day limitation
period and the notice-type pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, strict compliance with normal federal pleading standards
seems appropriate, absent circumstances where the court itself was respon-
sible for a delay in filing a complaint.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The litigation surrounding Title VII has largely clarified the jurisdic-
tional prerequisites to bringing a private action in a federal district court.
In doing so, the courts have disposed of a myriad of jurisdictional "pre-
requisites" interposed by employer-defendants as a bar to judicial enforce-
ment of the statute. Moreover, the courts have held that there are only two
jurisdictional prerequisites to commencing a private action under Title
VII: the filing of a charge with the EEOC and the institution of a suit
within 90 days after the receipt of the statutory notice from the EEOC.
In addition, these two prerequisites have been liberalized by a loose
interpretation of the state deferral requirement, by the application of toll-
ing in various circumstances, by a broad definition of what constitutes a
121. Huston v. General Motors Corp., 477 F.2d 1003, 5 FEP Cases 1032 (8th
Cir. 1973). See also Reyes v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 53 F.R.D. 293, 3
FEP Cases 121 (D. Kan. 1971).
122. Harris v. Walgreen's Dist. Center, 456 F.2d 588, 4 FEP Cases 342
(6th Cir. 1972); Guy v. Robbins 9: Meyers, Inc., 8 FEP Cases 309 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
123. Even the Huston court stated: "In ruling on such application [for
appointment of attorney and payment of fees], the district court should specify a
reasonable period of time for the filing of a formal complaint against the em-
ployer." 477 F.2d at 1008, 5 FEP Cases at 1032.
124. Harris v. National Tea Co., 454 F.2d 307, 4 FEP Cases 103 (7th Cir.
1971).
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